For each integer n ≥ 2, MVn denotes the variety of MV-algebras generated by the MV-chain with n elements. Algebras in MVn are represented as continuous functions from a Boolean space into a n-element chain equipped with the discrete topology. Using these representations, maximal subalgebras of algebras in MVn are characterized, and it is shown that proper subalgebras are intersection of maximal subalgebras. When A ∈ MV3, the mentioned characterization of maximal subalgebras of A can be given in terms of (...) prime filters of the underlying lattice of A, in the form that was conjectured by A. Monteiro. (shrink)

In the history of İslāmic thought, Māturīdī is a famous scholar both in the field of kalām and tafsir. Being approved by Māturīdī, the distinction of tafsir and ta’wīl, which makes possible to take the comments made about the verses into sistematic framework, is quite important. There is an important information both about content of the distinction approved by Māturīdī and the main reasons that necessiated this distinction in the introduction of Samarqandī’s Sharh at Ta’wīlāt. From this information, it is (...) understood that the distinction of tafsir and ta’wīl had dated back to older time than Māturīdī and previous scholars dealed with the problem that necessiated this distinction and Māturīdī inherited this distinction from his predecessors. Information in the Sharh at Ta’wīlāt reveals that according to Māturīdī the companions had made interpretation (ta’wīl) in addition to tafsir and the explanations made by certain evidences is tafsir too. Therefore this information gives us the opportunity flexing the acceptance of the idea “tafsir, is dedicated to the companions, ta'wīl is dedicated to fuqaha (jurists)” and asserting that companions and scholars made both tafsir and ta’wīl. In this paper, we will research whether the distinction tafsir and ta’wīl regarded by Māturīdī completely belonged to his or not and content of the distinction and its reasons. We will also analyze this distinction according to examples in the Ta’wîlāt. Summary: An important distinction is made between the concepts of tafsir and ta’wīl in the short preface of Māturīdī's tafsir, and this distinction is particularly prominent in contemporary tafsir studies. Because from the point of view of the value they carry, the explanations for these differences and concepts express the legitimacy of the following mufassirūn (writers of a commentary on the Qur’an) to be able to perform tafsir, as well as the value of the explanations found in tafsir literature in terms of certainty. In Ta'wīlāt, tafsir is described as the precise determination of what is intended. Determination of what is exactly intended in verse/wording is bound to certainly know the conditions under which it was revealed. Because they are the first to be addressed directly and they witnessed the context, the tafsir is only for the companions (ṣaḥābah pl. aṣḥāb). On the other hand, ta’wīl is not a definite determination of what is intended, but rather it is explained as putting the possibilities forward. In this case, ta’wīl is dedicated to the scholars after the companions. When we look at the other tafsir sources that include his views, it can be understood that this brief information in the preface of the tafsir which survived to our day is partially incomplete. Samarqandī's Sharhu’t-ta'wīlāt is the most important of these sources. According to the information here, Māturīdī states that some scholars distinguish tafsir and ta’wīl from each other. In these distinctions, tafsir is either described in relation to a definitive statement or in relation to being familiar with the conditions of revelation, while ta’wīl is described as extracting meanings from the verses and making possible meanings without claiming certainty. These explanations show that the distinction between tafsir and ta’wīl in Ta'wīlāt's preface was mainly based on the period before Māturīdī. These statements, which Māturīdī transmitted from some scholars in the beginning of Sharhu’t-ta'wīlāt, were then transmitted by Omar al-Nasafī, Mahāyimī and Molla Husrev. In some sources, it was also transmitted that similar explanations were made by scholars such as an-Nadr b. Shumayl, al-Hussein b. Fadl al-Bacelī and Ibn Durayd before Māturīdī.Some explanations of Māturīdī in Ta'wīlāt enables the theory of tafsir-ta’wīl to be understood at a wider level. When the examples are examined, it is observed that Māturīdī exhibited two types of attitude against the tafsir of the companions. He states that one of these is that if the transmission is true, what is intended is exactly what is stated in the narrated. The second is that he sometimes does not accept these explanations and suggests additional opinions. The reason he refuses is that sometimes he does not find the transmission reliable, and sometimes he thinks that companions performed ta'wīl. If this is the case, the dedication of ta’wīl to those coming later should not be absolutized. Because the companions can perform both tafsir and ta’wīl. The examples in Ta'wīlāt clearly reveal what areas tafsir, which is defined as a definite statement, covers. According to this, first, tafsir is related to the field of “invisible” about the past and the future. Secondly, its meaning and practice is only about the information of the “statement” about the issues that can be revealed by the Prophet (pbuh). In the third aspect, it is related to “revelation” information reporting the context in which the verses descended. In the beginning of Sharhu’t-ta'wīlāt, Māturīdī says that the explanations made based on the definitive evidences such as mutawātir (repetition; narration reported by large number reporters) and ijmā (consensus) also fall under the category of tafsir. However, it is also necessary to add intellectual evidence to these evidences. Because intellectual evidence is also important in the epistemology of Māturīdī. In fact, the truthfulness of nass (text) is primarily based on intellectual evidence. First, the issues of theology are proven by certain intellectual evidence, and then, on the basis of this, the meanings expressed by the nass acquire the value of certainty and truthfulness. With the definitive acceptance of reason in theology, what some nass express confirm each other and are used as evidence in the process of interpretation. Therefore, since some of the intellectual evidence, ijmā and mutawātir news provide definitive information, explanations based on them are also seen as tafsir. Considering the fact that the above-mentioned evidence was also used by those coming after the companions, it can be concluded that tafsir can be performed by not only the companions but also those coming after them. In this case, it should be accepted that tafsir is not performed only by the companions, and that the succeeding mufassirūn can also perform tafsir as well as ta’wīl. When we look at the examples based on these evidence, there are two different situations in Ta'wīlāt. The first is that Māturīdī sometimes has views on evidence based on mutawātir and ijmā and sometimes suggests different opinions from the assumptions that he said there was ijmā in particular. Because these evidences are certain, it is understandable that he remains bound to them. However, as a possible reason for his opposition to ijmā, it can be said that he thinks only the following generations enter the scope of ijmā. Because, according to Samarqandī, Māturīdī's objection to such information does not seem possible, since ijmā of the companions in a matter is accepted. Although he sometimes said that there was ijmā, the reason why no such ijmā was mentioned in other tafsir sources and sometimes, it may be considered that he did not respect other views in the face of ijmā as a reason for including different views or it may be thought that he was unaware of the different views that were transmitted. The second remarkable situation is that according to Māturīdī, intellectual evidence, in particular, can reveal only the “knowledge of existence” of the issues related to theology. Māturīdī thinks that their nature cannot be certainly known, and that the explanations made regarding their nature are only ta’wīl. For this reason, he firmly rejects the interpretation of the khabarī attributes about Allah in accordance with the idea of tashbīh and tajsīm (anthropomorphism). (shrink)

Este artículo aborda un aspecto de la vida intelectual de Alejo Peyret especialmente relevante para apreciar su originalidad: el lugar que ocupa la obra de Pierre-Joseph Proudhon en su pensamiento. Se detallan las traducciones de Proudhon que Peyret realizó y publicó, introduciendo así su pensamiento en la región, en diálogo con la problemática central que visualizaba: la disputa federales-unitarios, pero no limitándose a ella. Se muestran sus coincidencias con Juan Bautista Alberdi, y las divergencias en sus respectivas concepciones de federalismo. (...) Se revisan intervenciones públicas de Peyret basadas en el trabajo de Proudhon para proponer vías alternativas de organización social y económica, impositiva y financiera, opuestas al programa del liberalismo en la Argentina del siglo XIX. Finalmente, se evidencia el lugar singular que ocupa Peyret en el concierto de las ideas en su época y en la región. (shrink)

Neste ensaio, reflecte-se sobre o significado de «eutanásia» como conceito e como acto. Da etimologia, à exploração do sentido paradigmático de actos presentes na história do pensamento que ajudam a enquadrar o que está em causa quando a questão da eutanásia surge. A morte. Que se entende por «boa morte»? O sofrimento. O suicídio. Matar um ser humano: de que falamos? As origens contemporâneas da eutanásia. Que alternativa?

The traditions about isrāʾīliyyāt that were seen almost in all the types of Islamic sciences appeared in the sources of tafsīr from early periods. These traditions that were generally used to explain the Qurʾān were seen problem and critisized by some exegetical specialists. Even though corresponding to a relative later period in the classical era, an approach was tried to put forward in view of the traditions about isrāʾīliyyāt. This methodological concern for isrāʾīliyyāt in classical period has increased and been (...) influential for many researchers from east and west to work on this issue in modern times. There has been reached to important results about the issues of the definition of isrāʾīliyyāt, the source of it, its spread in Islamic sciences, its aim of usage, the progress of these positive-negative attitudes against these traditions in historical process. But it is important to discuss some evaluations and analysis again that put forward in this process when different cases about the issue are taken into consideration. According to this, a series of problem, such as how the isrāʾīliyyāt can be defined in tafsīr, when the criticism of isrāʾīliyyāt started, whether Biqāʿī was the first exegete who made reference to Bible or not will be discussed considering relevant resources in this article.Summary: Since the early periods, isrā’īliyyāt narratives were used as a source of information in tafsīrs. These narratives, which are transmitted in various tafsīrs of the Qur’ān, one of the main sources of Islamic religion, have also taken the methodological interests of some exegete since the early periods. This interest continued in the modern period, and both Western and Eastern researchers made research on isrā’īliyyāt. Some of the findings, analyses, and claims available in researches on this subject will be reexamined in this article. The first of these is the problem of the definition of isrā’īliyyāt. In contemporary research, inclusive definitions are made for isrā’īliyyāt, seen in all sources. These definitions do not allow for a refined description of isrā’īliyyāt which is handled in terms of different intentions in the sources of each different field and which varies in terms of the issues it covers, leading to the underestimation of some of its aspects in relevant fields. In the definitions, it is stated that isrā’īliyyāt is mostly learned from the Ahl al-Kitāb, (the People of the Book) it became widespread along with Islām and it included narratives about caliphs, dynasties, and Mahdī, as well. Another issue is to be emphasized that they are fictive or mythological. In classical tafsīrs, isrā’īliyyāt is observed to be related mainly with the history of the Ahl al-Kitāb or with the subjects they know about. In the modern era, the narratives about the ancestors of the Arabs have been identified as isrā’īliyyāt. If some of the isrā’īliyyāt narratives are related to the history of Arabs, then their resource should be the historical-cultural memory of Arabs. However, as almost all Qur’ānic stories were somewhat known before the revelation period and relations with the Ahl al-Kitāb dated back to times long before the Islamic period, the claim that these narratives became widespread along with Islām should be revised. It is also problematic to emphasize the legendary nature of some of the isrā’īliyyāt and to make that as a reason to reject all. Such emphasis also leads to the underestimation of the functions of narratives in tafsīrs. In isrā’īliyyāt, tafsīr was used for i) interpreting the ambiguous words in the stories, ii) to bring evidence to the Ahl al-Kitāb, and ii) tarhīb-targhīb (encouragement-warning). These narratives can be used as a source in tafsīr unless they are explicitly falsified by the data of fields such as history, history of religions and archaeology as well as the Qur’ān and the true Sunnah. The first criticisms of isrā’īliyyāt are claimed to belong to exegete like Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 543/148) or Ibn ‘Aṭīyah (d. 541/1147). However, criticism of isrā’īliyyāt is also observed in the tafsīrs of earlier exegete, such as al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) or al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067). They do not necessarily have to use the term isrā’īliyyāt explicitly in their criticism like the later ones. If the narratives they criticize and the reasons for their criticism are the same as those of the later exegete, it will be necessary to date the criticism of isrā’īliyyāt back to the 4th Century of the Hegira. The understanding that "the expression in the story is sufficient, it is unnecessary to deal with the ambiguities; instead, it is necessary to deal with the lesson and wisdom in the story" is one of the criteria that Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), who is deemed to be the pioneer of the strict criticism of isrā’īliyyāt in the modern period, took as basis in this criticism, is valid for the exegete of the classical period, as well. Although exegete, such as al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), al-Māturīdī, al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), and Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745/1344) who had this understanding, gave place to isrā’īliyyāt, these people recognized that "these narratives were not final, binding or necessary”, indeed. The understanding that such expression in the story is sufficient, which is one of the reasons for such awareness in the classical period, seems to have turned into a strict rejection in the modern period. Another issue is the claim that Biqā‘ī (d. 885/1480) was the first exegete to systematically benefit from the Bible in tafsīr in the classical period. However, al-Daylamī (d. 593/1197) before Biqā‘ī, is also observed to have used the Old Testament systematically in tafsīr. He cited the Tanakh in his period in two ways. He either directly quoted from the translation of Tanakh or the Hebrew text written in Arabic letters. Another exegete who used the Tanakh as a source in his tafsīr was al-Ṣafadī (d. 696/1296). He enriched his tafsīr with systematic quotations from the Tanakh. Therefore, the use of the Bible as a source of interpretation in the classical period should not be started with Biqā‘ī. The reason why the pioneer exegete of the classical period did not directly use the Bible is claimed to be the fact that they falsified it and deemed the isrā’īliyyāt narrated from the predecessors to be more reliable. However, it is known that a significant portion of the isrā’īliyyāt, which was orally transferred from the predecessors, is based on written sources, particularly including the apocryphal texts. So just like the Bible, isrā’īliyyāt, which was orally transferred from the predecessors, is problematic in terms of authenticity. This allows us to argue that classical exegete have an inconsistent attitude, indeed. On the other hand, when we take into account the fact that classical exegetes criticize these narratives from time to time and believe that they are not final or binding, the problem of potential inconsistency disappears. Accordingly, they did not deem chain transmission of these narratives from the predecessors by reliable transmitters to be a sufficient reason for their acceptance and adoption for good and all. (shrink)

Este artigo tem a intenção indicar um uso propositivo da noção de imagem de pensamento presente na obra Diferença e repetição de Gilles Deleuze, pois de acordo com esta referência, é típico da repetição afirmar-se, permitindo a emergência do que difere. De outro modo, a noção de imagem do pensamento ocorre na filosofia de Deleuze em três ocasiões, nas obras Nietzsche e a filosofia, Proust e os signos e em Diferença e repetição e nestas obras, nem sempre esta perspectiva coincide, (...) deslocando-se de um uso mais crítico para um uso mais positivo. Em termos estratégicos e metodológicos, é justamente sobre este último enfoque, de caráter construtivo, em que nos apoiaremos. A discussão gira em torno de uma imagem afirmativa do pensamento em filosofia face à diferença no ato da repetição, o que significa que a diferença em filosofia traria consigo, em seu movimento, um processo interno de diferenciação, cuja potência a repete, mas não da mesma forma, senão transmutando-a em outra possibilidade do que significa pensar. (shrink)

RESUMO O uso de linguagem codificada e esópica nos trabalhos dos semioticistas que integraram a Escola Semiótica de Tártu-Mosou foi motivado pelo desejo de serem compreendidos pelo círculo e não compreendidos por possíveis intrusos indesejáveis dos órgãos de controle soviéticos. Um dos termos centrais utilizados pela Escola - os “sistemas modelizantes secundários” - foi sugerido por Vladímir Uspiénski com o objetivo de substituir a palavra "semiótica", associada à semiótica ocidental. Ao cotejar o artigo de Iúri Lotman Sobre o problema da (...) tipologia da cultura, de 1967, com a tradução para o português do Brasil de Lucy Seki, que integrou a coletânea Semiótica Russa, organizada por Boris Schnaiderman, objetivo verificar se as peculiaridades do texto original, que surgiram devido às condições histórico-políticos da sua criação, foram preservadas na tradução. ABSTRACT The use of codified and Aesopian language in the works of the semioticians who were members of the Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School was motivated by the desire to be understood by the School members and notunderstood by possible unwanted intruders from Soviet control organizations. One of the key terms they used was secondary modeling systems, which Vladimir Uspensky suggested to replace the word semiotics, associated with Western semiotics. By comparing Yuri Lotman’s essay Problems in the Typology of Culture to Lucy Seki’s translation of the essay into Brazilian Portuguese, which is part of the book Semiótica Russa [Russian Semiotics], edited by Boris Schnaiderman, I intend to verify if particularities of the original text, which resulted from the historical and political context in which the essay was produced, were maintained in the translation. (shrink)

Civil disobedience is a form of protest consisting in an act contrary to law, whose aim is to bring about a change in laws or policies deemed unjust. In the traditional Western philosophical debate, civil disobedience was mainly discussed and justified within the boundaries of a democratic regime. John Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience is explicitly based on this liberal assumption. He conceptualises civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent, conscientious and political breach of the law, only appropriate to nearly just (...) societies, hence to democratic regimes. This article intends to question Rawls’ premise by considering civil disobedience from a different perspective: when it is undertaken outside of a nearly just framework, precisely in not fully democratic contexts, such as the so-called “anocracies”, regimes that mix democratic and autocratic traits. The emblematic case of Sudan’s most recent actions of civil disobedience is examined to argue that, contrary to the liberal conceptualisation, civil disobedience does have a role and appropriateness in frameworks of this kind, where the aim is not only to oppose unjust laws or policies, but also to achieve a broader structural change through rigorously nonviolent forms of political action. (shrink)

Nursing Sciences are at a moment of paradigmatic transition. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the new epistemological paradigms of nursing science from a critical approach. In this paper, we identified and analysed some new research lines and trends which anticipate the reorganization of nursing sciences and the paradigms emerging from nursing care: biotechnology‐centred knowledge; the interface between nursing knowledge and new information technologies; body care centred knowledge; the human body as a cyborg body; and the rediscovery (...) of an aesthetic knowledge in nursing care. (shrink)

Here, an epidemiological model considering pro and anti-vaccination groups is proposed and analyzed. In this model, susceptible individuals can migrate between these two groups due to the influence of false and true news about safety and efficacy of vaccines. From this model, written as a set of three ordinary differential equations, analytical expressions for the disease-free steady state, the endemic steady state, and the basic reproduction number are derived. It is analytically shown that low vaccination rate and no influx to (...) the pro-vaccination group have similar impacts on the long-term amount of infected individuals. Numerical simulations are performed with parameter values of the COVID-19 pandemic to illustrate the analytical results. The possible relevance of this work is discussed from a public health perspective. (shrink)

As in classical Latin philosophical and theological texts, Spinoza did not make any semantic distinction between the concepts of conscientia and conscius, and used one interchangeably. But the concept of conscientia is used as an “inner voice” or “conscience” meaning “moral sensitivity” or “moral awareness” and expresses both rational and irrational processes in traditioanl philosophy. On the other hand, the concept of conscius is used in the sense of “consciousness” and expresses a mental or psychological reflexive activity based on rational (...) processes in the same tradition. Based on Spinoza's use of the two concepts in the same sense, this study claims that “moral sensitivity” is formed as a result of reflexive thinking, which is a mental action. Where consciousness is understood as a reflexive activity based on the relationship between ideas, it is argued that “moral awareness” occurs in the mind as an idea formed as a result of the relationship between ideas. In the study, it is determined that Spinoza developed a kind of “moral consciousness” theory based on the awareness in question, rather than a “conscience theory”. The main focus of the study is that the idea of “good” and “evil”, which are the basic concepts in Spinoza’s ethics, arise from the idea of “joy” and “sadness” that occur as emotions in the mind. Here, “joy” or “sadness” is considered as the primary ideas that occur in the mind as a result of the affection of the body, and “good” or “bad” as secondary ideas formed by the mind as a result of contemplation on these primary ideas. In the article, the theory of “moral consciousness” is based on the “ideas of ideas”, which are the secondary ideas in question. Keywords: Consciousness, Conscience, Awareness, Moral Consciousness, Good-Evil, Joy-Sadness. (shrink)

This article covers the critical edition, translation and analysis of the epistle on creed, al- Muʿtamad min al-muʿtaqad, written by the famous Hanafī jurist ʿAlāʾ al-dīn Abū Bakr b. Masʿūd al-Kāsānī. In his work, which can be evaluated in the literature of creed, al-Kāsānī explains the basics of Hanafī-Māturīdī belief in a brief and concise manner without any discussion. This study consists of three main parts: examination, critical edition and translation. In the examination part of the study, the life of (...) the author is handled with various aspects, and at the same time information is given about the relation of the work to the author, its position in the literature, its method and content as well as its manuscripts. Then, based on the six manuscript copies of the work which are available in various manuscript libraries, the critical edition and the translation of the work is given. It is aimed that this work, which is discussed in Turkish for the first time in an academic article, will contribute to the studies on Hanafī-Māturīdī creed literature to some extent. (shrink)

Cultural phenomena never exist except in connexion with the agents of human life that make them possible and endow them with their authentic value. Culture is not of itself a fertilising rain—nothing human can be ‘of itself, an island of abstraction. Literary themes, then, are things that happen in and to someone's historical life. Their value is manifested to its full extent when the theme that interests us is seen as the expression, through an individual, of a particular people, who, (...) in giving life to the literary theme, achieves its self-realisation in terms of a value structure. We have rather too frequently thought about comparative literature as if its motivating force were always some theme common to several literatures, and as if these literatures were limited to the historico-geographical space in which the migratory theme takes up residence and progressively ‘evolves’. This over-abstract and anti-vital idea leads to another, the notion of the theme in its pure state, the Urtema, in many comparative studies. (shrink)

This article examines the metaphysical and moral foundations of Spinoza’s account of suicide. Spinoza’s treatment of suicide is brought into question by his conatus doctrine, which posits the striving to preserve one’s own being as the very essence of existence. Accordingly, suicide, or the termination of life, as the destruction of one’s own being, represents the exhaustion of this striving. The analysis of the causes that lead to self-destruction has sparked significant debate in Spinoza’s literature, raising the question of whether (...) suicide is a passive and irrational decision or a free and rational choice. This article, which engages with prominent scholars of this literature, notably Matson, Bennett, LeBuffe and Nadler, aims to alleviate this controversy by offering alternative readings and arguments. It concludes that free and rational suicide does not exist in Spinoza’s thought; instead, the “suicide of reason or rationality” forms the basis for bodily suicide. (shrink)

Na produção filosófica de Michel Foucault é possível encontrar, no terceiro eixo de suas pesquisas, conceitos voltados para as práticas subjetivas segundo a relação que o sujeito pode manter consigo mesmo, a ponto de se constituir como obra de arte. Neste tipo de abordagem, a moral – este conjunto de regras coercitivas, que consistem em julgar ações e intenções referindo-se a valores transcendentes – sofre um “golpe” em favor da ética. Para o professor uma possibilidade se abre nesta distinção entre (...) moral e ética, permitindo um deslocamento dos valores constituídos para a invenção de novos valores, em que a potencialização política no seu campo de trabalho pode significar uma estilização ética da sua própria existência. Dans la production philosophique de Michel Foucault c'est possible retrouve, dans la troisième phase de ses recherches, concepts crées sur les pratiques subjectives, c'est-à-dire, sur la relation que le sujet instaure avec lui-même, de manière à se constituer comme oeuvre de l'art. Dans ce type d'abordage, la morale - d'ensemble de règles coercitif, que consistent en juger les actions et les intentions en référence aux valeurs transcendantes, souffre un "coup" en faveur de l'éthique. Pour le professeur, ouvre une possibilité cette distinction entre morale et éthique, qui le permettre un déplacement des valeurs fixées pour l'invention de nouvelles valeurs, dont la puissance politique dans son domaine de travail passe par une stylisation éthique de l'existence elle-même. (shrink)

Ministers of the Church, whose characters were well defined in the second half of the fourth century, were more and more identified as the perfect believers. In the texts of John Chrysostom several models of “spiritual man” emerge on the basis of his personal experience and the evolution of his works: the monk, the presbyter, and the bishop. One notes that the relation of the Church to secular institutions is of greater importance in the works of Chrysostom, paying as he (...) does particular attention to the autonomy of the Church. In an original way he refrains from criticizing political institutions, preferring to express a balanced view. He holds that a coexistence with political authorities is possible, and he urges a moral conver-gence with them. Ecclesial ministries find a more solid basis in the Chrysostom’s complex and sometimes pained statements, both in their ideal expressions and in their concrete effects on the society of the fourth century. (shrink)

The interpretations of the Pauline expression spiritual body can be indicative to verify the relations between Origen and the Antiochene tradition. After shortly examining such a definition in works of both the contexts, this article summarizes the exterior characteristics of the spiritual body. Are respectively dealt with: its link to the earthly body, the transformation process that led to it. Noticeable analogies have emerged in the importance given to the physical sphere; Antiochene writers, particularly John Chrysostom, gibe however more importance (...) to moral differences between individual bodies, partly negating theories about a material replacement of particles and collocating the spiritual body in a more detached view, that the seed metaphor doesn't express yet completely. The culture after Origen is oriented to a generalized condemnation of chair, in a more static and not gradual view of the body conditions; but the basic role of Origenian thought about body consistence and transformations is evident. (shrink)

PurposeThe acute-on-chronic exacerbations of end-stage respiratory diseases often result in prolonged hospital stays, relating these events to ethical conflicts in the fields of medical futility and distributive justice. This study aimed to understand patients’ preferences for life-sustaining treatments when clinically stable and during regular follow-up visits, and to determine the factors that can influence these preferences.ProcedureThis was a prospective, observational, exploratory study using convenience sampling. Over a three-year period, the study enrolled 106 adult outpatients with end-stage pulmonary disease on long-term (...) oxygen treatment with/without noninvasive mechanical ventilation with dyspnoea scores of 6 or more in the modified Borg dyspnoea scale and one of the following: Gold stage IV, diffusing capacity <40%, heart failure ) stage III/IV, or systolic pulmonary artery... (shrink)

Antropologicamente, toda a experiência humana é apenas e só uma experiência de vida. Nesta nossa dimensão humana comum, nenhum ser humano pode saber o que a morte é, por experiência, que necessariamente tem de ser uma experiência própria. E não há outra experiência qualquer que possa ser considerada «nossa». Não há, pois, uma «experiência de morte». Há uma experiência do «morrer», que pode ser relatada. Relato de uma «experiência de morte», na nossa consciência.

A experiência é apenas um estado instantâneo de impressão sensível nisso que tem a experiência. Esta expressão resume a substância epistemológica do que constitui a posição empiricista polarizada na forma de pensamento paradigmatizada por David Hume e acriticamente aceite por Immanuel Kant. Tal posição, ao invés da tese aristotélica, impede qualquer modo trans-sensível, logo, trans-material de pensamento. A metafísica torna-se impossível. Kant procura ultrapassar esta impossibilidade através da criação de uma construção lógico-epistemológica que designa como arquitectónica transcendental. O mundo em (...) que o transcendentalismo kantiano pôs a intelectualidade a viver é um mundo reduzido a um jogo lógico, insubstante para além de si próprio, num solipsismo que condena o ser humano a viver definitivamente alienado de uma realidade que não seja a de seu próprio pensamento. A sua proposta de superação deste novo impasse através de uma teoria da acção cai na contradição de postular teoricamente algo que a razão nunca pode postular, pois não há ou pode haver qualquer referência empírica. A verdade da razão teórica impede a verdade quer da razão prática quer da razão estética. (shrink)

This study examined the ethical issues experienced by nurses working in a small group of elderly persons’ care settings in the UK, using a survey questionnaire previously used in other countries for examining the cultural aspects of ethical issues. However ‘culture’ relates not only to ethnicity but also the organizational culture in which care is delivered. Nurses working in elderly persons’ care settings described a range of issues faced when caring for elderly terminally ill people, which illustrated the different needs (...) of patients, relatives, professionals and society. These issues related to the unique needs of elderly people (such as dementia sufferers) and could have an impact on patients’ quality of death. (shrink)

There are two widely accepted definitions of ilm al-tafsīr in the hāshiyahs on Anwār al-Tanzīl. The most accepted ones are as follows: Tafsīr is the science that investigates the states of the word of Allah in terms of signifying the will of Allah. This definition mainly belongs to al-Taftāzānī in his hāshiyah on al-Kashshāf. Despite the objections directed to it, the definition was accepted in the later phases and there were not any detailed discussions on it. From this point of (...) view, it can be concluded that there is a common tafsīr definition in Anwār al-Tanzīl hāshiyahs due to the fact that the majority concurred with this definition. The prevalence of this definition is also out of the question for al-Kashshāf hāshiyahs. Its prevalence in the following literature may be attributed to its implementation in accordance with the definition requirements. Because in the definitions made based on the subject, the subject is regarded as genus, and how this subject is addressed is also considered as a difference (fasl). Accordingly, in the above definition, the subject of the tafsīr is explained as the states of Kalam, and the direction in which it is addressed is expressed in terms of the will of Allah. Thus, the subject of tafsīr and its research direction were explained and its difference from other sciences researching the Qur’ān was also stated. According to the second most widespread definition in the hāshiyahs, tafsīr is a science in which the meanings of the Kalam of Allah are known in terms of human capacity/capability. This definition is more or less a description (rasm) compared to the previous one. Hence, it is a looser definition. For this reason, the definition does not allow tafsīr to be separated from other sciences. Because, the meanings of words in the Qur’ān, language sciences and religious sciences are also explored. However, in the other definition, the difference of tafsīr was taken into consideration by including the directional record and the will/intent expression more quickly. On the other hand, the second definition has a limitation of being based on human capacity/capability that reveals some features of the tafsīr more clearly. This limitation expresses that the research in tafsīr is based on suppositional data in one way and continuity in another. Both definitions in the hāshiyahs show that there are clear and common definitions of ilm al-tafsīr between the hijri 9th and 12th centuries. It is stated that with a few exceptions, in almost all of the hāshiyahs, the ilm al-tafsīr is divided into two parts as tafsīr and ta’wīl. The tafsīr here is based on narrative, and ta’wīl is based on reason. Explanation of both of them in this way can be seen in al-Kashshāf. Accordingly, it is understood that both concepts become evident in al-Kashshāf and Anwār al-Tanzīl hāshiyahs. However, when we look at some tafsīr introductions, and literature of ulūm al-Qur’ān, it is observed that vastly different explanations have been made about them. This gives the impression that there is no clear and widespread acceptance of them. However, by explaining as mentioned, their meaning becomes clear in the next literature. Because this explanation about them is essentially a statement that al-Māturīdī conveyed from his predecessors. Accordingly, an explanation about both concepts that was conveyed from the early period has gained acceptance and became widespread especially in the sharhs-hāshiyahs for the following process. Since al-Baydāwī associates both concepts with muhkam and mutashābih, the commentators also explained this relationship. They contain the definitions of the muhkam and mutashābih, which al-Baydāwī made in accordance with Shāfi‘ī method. Accordingly, muhkam are the ones that is clear in terms of what is meant, and do not need further explanation. Examples of muhkam are verses about shari‘a 'orders, inheritance distribution, transactions, and marriage issues. The provisions on these issues should be based on narrative, not reason. Thus, the explanation of muhkam becomes tafsīr. The mutashābih is interpreted since the meaning is not clear. In this case, their interpretation is also ta’wīl. The religious sciences that tafsīr benefits from are explained as being hadith, fiqh, theology, mysticism, and usūl al-fiqh, and this case expresses a general opinion. Literary sciences required for tafsīr are also described as glossary, derivation, morphology, grammar, bayān, ma‘ānī, and badī‘. However, there are two opinions about the knowledge of disciplines such as prosody, rhyme, qard al-shi‘r, khat, and inshā. According to one opinion, since these sciences are not related to the Qur’ān, it is not necessary to know them in order to interpret them. According to the other one, for a competent interpretation activity, these sciences must be known, and their data are thought to contribute to tafsīr. (shrink)